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Abstract 
In Flanders (Belgium), distribution companies are to a large extent owned by the municipalities 
and as such these municipalities collect an important share of the profits from electricity 
distribution. This situation (by many it is seen as a hidden tax) cannot be maintained because, 
in the process of electricity market liberalisation, the ownership will be reshuffled and because 
the old regulation mechanism, allowing for such cash flows, will be revised. 
This paper presents some simulations on the restructuring of the electricity distribution sector, 
using a partial equilibrium model. The focus of the simulations is on the impact of the choice of 
the regulation mechanism on prices and on the municipalities’ budget. Three regulation schemes 
are simulated, 'rate-of-return' (ROR) regulation, 'constant profit per unit of output' (CPU) 
regulation and 'price-cap' (PC) regulation. The simulations show that, irrespective of the 
regulation scheme, it is not obvious that end-user electricity prices will decrease after the 
liberalisation. Moreover, the restructuring will have a large impact on the profits received by the 
municipalities. The sign of this impact depends on the regulation mechanism that is imposed, 
but it appears that, from the three regulation mechanisms that were analysed, the ROR-
mechanism performs worst, both in terms of municipal cash flows and of economic welfare. 
Keywords:   Electricity distribution, Electricity markets, Electricity modelling, 
Regulation, Strategic behaviour 
JEL-classification:  D42, L13, L43, L94 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, the electricity distribution sector is in the 
middle of a process of fundamental restructuring. Until recently, vertically integrated companies 
carried out electricity distribution as well as retail activities
1. Each company had a monopoly in 
its own supply area for both these activities. The objective of the Flemish government is to 
restructure the sector, such that distribution and retail activities are separated. Distribution 
remains a monopoly activity, but the retail market will be open for competition. This process 
should be finished within the next one to two years. The restructuring requires a fundamental 
rethinking of the way in which the sector is operated and regulated. The basic idea is to 
introduce more competition in those market segments where competition is viable and to 
introduce (better) regulation in those branches – usually transmission and distribution transport 
– where competition is not viable. 
This paper focuses on the impact of the choice of the regulation mechanism on the budget of the 
municipalities and on the end-user prices for electricity. In the pre-reform world, the ownership 
of the distribution sector was in the hands of the municipalities and as such they collected an 
important share of the profits. This situation could easily be maintained, as electricity 
distribution and retail were monopoly activities. Due to the restructuring, ownership is 
reshuffled. Depending on the initial type of the distribution company in which they participated, 
the municipalities take a majority share in the distribution companies (ranging from 70% to 
100%), and a minority share in (some of) the retail companies. According to many, this will 
result in reduced cash flows for the municipalities because of two reasons. First, as electricity 
distribution activities will be subject to regulation, municipalities cannot expect large profit 
margins in this segment of the market. Second, competitive pressure will also reduce profit 
margins on retail activities. Furthermore, it is the explicit objective of the Federal as well as of 
the Flemish authorities to reduce end-user electricity prices through this liberalisation of the 
electricity markets as it is often claimed that end-user electricity prices are among the highest in 
Europe. 
However, we claim that the impact on municipal cash flows and on end-user electricity prices 
will crucially depend on the extent of increased competition in generation and in retailing, and 
on the type of regulation that is chosen for the distribution and transmission activities. In 
practice, the Federal and the regional regulatory authorities opt for a rate-of-return regulation 
mechanism, both for transmission and distribution
2. From the literature on regulation, we know 
that rate-of return regulation has some drawbacks and it is the objective of this paper to 
                                            
1  In this paper, whenever we use the term ‘electricity distribution’, we mean the transport of electricity at the 
distribution level. ‘Retail’ activities, are activities related to the selling of electricity. 
2  In Belgium, transmission is a Federal matter and distribution is a Regional matter.  Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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illustrate these potential negative impacts, relative to other types of regulation such as price cap 
regulation or constant profit per unit of output regulation
3. 
The paper follows a numerical approach and presents some simulations on the restructuring of 
the electricity distribution sector. We use a partial equilibrium model that captures the most 
fundamental features of the sector. The modelling approach is similar to the modelling approach 
followed by, for example, Hobbs (2001) and Wei and Smeers (1999)
4. The model in this paper is 
different in the sense that it does not incorporate a network. It does, however, distinguish one 
transmission and three distribution grid operators, each behaving strategically. 
In the (discussion of the) simulations, attention will be paid to changes in the relative size of the 
profit flows generated by the restructuring, and on the impact of liberalisation and (re-) 
regulation on end-user prices and welfare. It is not the intention of this paper to simulate the 
monetary impact of the restructuring on the municipal cash flows. Rather, the paper intends to 
illustrate how different regulation mechanisms can have different impacts on the resulting 
outcome. 
Section 2 describes the model and the fist-order conditions for the solution. These first-order 
conditions are explicitly presented because the model is solved as a complementarity problem. 
The model that is described in this section is a general formulation of the model that will be 
used for the simulations. Section 3 then describes the data, the model calibration and the 
simulated scenarios. In this section some assumptions are made that further simplify the model. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the simulation results and, finally, section 5 summarises and 
concludes. 
2.  THE MODEL 
Let  H,I  and T  be the sets of retail customers, of distribution companies and of non-
overlapping time periods, respectively. Furthermore, define M  as the Cartesian product of H  
and I , i.e. 
  () {} ,  and  hi h i × ∈∈ M=H I= H I  (1) 
The set M  contains all combinations of retail customers and distribution companies that are 
distinguished in the model. Retail customers cannot choose the distribution company that 
transports their electricity. 
Consumer  h 's inverse demand for electricity in period t  through distribution company i  is 
written as  () ,
d
m mt p q , with m ∈ M  and  ,1 , ,..., ddd
m m m qq   =     q
T . This formulation allows for 
substitution between different time periods (e.g. from peak to off-peak periods.), but implicitly 
assumes that customers are not affected by the demand of other customers. Inverse demand is 
assumed downward sloping and concave. 
                                            
3  See for example Train (1991) and Laffont and Tirole (1994). 
4  See for example Hobbs (2001), for a short survey of models based on a similar approach. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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The focus of the model is on electricity demand via the distribution grid, although demand via 
the transmission grid is also taken into account. Therefore, apart from retail customers, we also 
have direct customers, i.e. large companies buying electricity directly from the generators. This 
electricity is delivered through the transmission grid and does not involve any distribution 
activity. The direct customer's inverse demand for electricity is written as  ()
d
, dc t dc p q , with 
,1 , ,..., ddd
dc dc dc qq  =   q
T . Again, this inverse demand is downward sloping and concave. Finally, the 
set  + M  is defined as  {} dc ∪ M . 
The per-unit price paid by customers is equal to the sum of the prices charged by the different 
firms operating in the electricity sector plus the value added tax () t , i.e. 
  () () , ,,,, 1 wt rd ir
mt mt mt mt mt p t pppp =+ + + + .  , mt ∀∈ ∀ ∈ + MT  (2) 
The generation, transmission, distribution and retail firms charge the price  ,,, ,, wt rd i
mt mt mt ppp  and 
,
j r
mr p  respectively. By definition, direct customers are not supplied through the distribution grid, 
and therefore, we have  ,, 0 di r
dc t dc t pp == . 
The following paragraphs describe the basic structure of the model. It is assumed that all 
market players act in their own interest, i.e. all firms maximise profits and consumers maximise 
utility. Generators set quantities, taking transmission, distribution and retail (if applicable) 
prices as given. The transmission, the distribution and the retail firms all set the prices of their 
service, taking the prices set by the other players as given. The first-order conditions for each 
player’s optimisation problem are explicitly written down as they serve as an input for the 
numerical computations. In many cases, some additional results can be obtained from a 
simplification and reshuffling of these conditions. However, this is not done as we focus on the 
numerical results. 
Electricity generation 
One incumbent () in  and one entrant () en  generate electricity. Both firms maximise profits. In 
the most general formulation of the model, both firms have market power. The entrant supplies 
electricity to the liberalised market, whereas the incumbent supplies both the liberalised and the 
regulated market. In the liberalised market a Cournot game is played, in the regulated market 
the regulator sets the price. 
Let  R  and U  be the sets of regulated and liberalised (or unregulated) market segments, 
respectively, with  ∪ + RU = M  and  ∩∅ RU =. Then  in qU  and  in qR  are the incumbent's 
output vector in the liberalised and the regulated markets. His profit is written as 
  () () ,, ,, , in in in w in w in in in
rt rt ut ut t t
ru t
pq pq C Q
∈∈ ∈
 











. This formulation assumes that each market segment has its own 
wholesale price  ,
w
j t p , with  {} , j ∈ RU . This assumption is maintained all through the paper 
and also holds for the other players in the market. The incumbent firm takes the output Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
   
5
decision of the entrant as given, as well as the prices set by the transmission, the distribution 
and the retail companies. Its impact on end-user prices is described through equation (2), with a 
tilde added to the prices that are considered as given, i.e. 
  ()() () , ,,,, 1 dw t r d i r
m mt mt mt mt mt p t pppp = + +++ q    , mt ∀∈ ∀ ∈ + MT  (4) 
In some simulations, the generator is faced with a price ceiling  , rt p  set by the regulator, i.e.  
  ,,,
wt r
rt rt rt ppp + ≤  ,  () ,
w
rt λ   , rt ∀∈ ∈ RT  (5) 
with  ,
w
rt λ  the Lagrange multiplier of this price constraint. 
The transport of electricity induces some losses, both at the transmission and at the distribution 
level. These losses are denoted  tr l  and  di l , respectively. Therefore, in order to satisfy the 
demand  ,
d
mt q , the generators have to supply  ,
j
mt q  with  {} , ji n e n ∈ , such that 
  () () ,, , 11 in en d













Note that, depending on the market segment and the scenario, the supply of the entrant can be 
zero. 
In equation (3), the first two terms in the square brackets are revenues from electricity sales to 
the regulated and the unregulated market segments, respectively. The last term represents 
production costs. By assumption, production costs are convex. 
Generator  j 's generation capacity (in MW) is labelled  j Q . In each period, aggregate output 
cannot exceed available generation capacity, denoted by  j
t hQ , with  t h  the length of period t  











t γ   {} , tj i n e n ∈∈ T,  (7) 
















in in in w in w in in in
rt rt ut ut t t q ru t
wt r w







mt mt t r mt di
pq pq C Q
st p p p r t
Qh Q t
Qq t







 Π =+ −
 
+ ≤∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
≤∀ ∈
= ∀∈















()() () , ,,,, 1 dw t r d i r
m mt mt mt mt mt t pppp m t = + +++ ∀∈ ∀ ∈ q + M, T 
 (8) 
Once again, note that a tilde indicates variables that are considered as given by the player. The 
constraints without a multiplier are substituted into the objective function and the other Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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constraints before derivatives are taken. With  in L  the incumbent's Lagrange function, this 
results in the following first order conditions 
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Now, consider the unregulated part of the electricity market, where the incumbent is faced with 
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 Π = −  
≤∀ ∈
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This results in the following first-order conditions for the entrant: 
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These are the traditional first-order conditions for profit maximisation, i.e. marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost in all market segments. In fact, equations (11) and (14) are the reaction 
functions of the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. Given the assumptions on the demand 
and the cost functions, a pure strategy Cournot equilibrium exists in the liberalised market. 
Electricity transmission 
The simulations focus on the effects of structural and regulatory changes in the electricity 
sector. Therefore, the technical features of transmission and distribution are modelled in a very Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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simple and straightforward way. The transmission grid contains one transmission line with 
capacity  tr Q , and the grid operator is assumed to be a profit-maximising firm, subject to 
regulation. The transmission firm takes the generation, distribution and retail prices as fixed 
and optimises its profit by setting transmission prices  ,
tr
mt p  and transmission capacity  tr Q . It is 
assumed that the cost of providing transmission services is separable into operating costs and 
capacity costs. In general, one transmission price can be set in each market segment, but it can 
also be imposed that the grid operator has to charge a postage stamp tariff. In the latter case, 
this uniform price should be such that the firm’s profit equals zero. The firm is subject to a 
regulation constraint  tr R . Different regulation schemes can be simulated. They will be discussed 




















tr tr tr tr tr tr tr
mt mt t t pQ m t
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dw t r d i r
m mt mt mt mt mt
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. Furthermore,  tr
t Q  is the total amount of electricity transported through the 
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t tr t
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PC R   () ,, ,, 1 tr tr tr tr tr
t r mt mt mt mt
mm tt
Rl p q p q
∈∈ ∈∈




ROR R  is rate-of-return regulation, where the cap on profits is a function of the 
regulated asset base. It is assumed that the asset base is proportional to transmission capacity, 
with  tr s  the allowed, fair rate-of-return,  tr k  the cost of capital, and  tr tr sk > .  tr f  is a penalty 
for unused transmission capacity. The regulator has some exogenous idea on what is an 
acceptable level of transmission capacity, labelled  ˆtr Q . Investment in capacity beyond  ˆtr Q  is 
penalised at an increasing rate
5. The ROR-regulation mechanism (17) gives incentives to 
increase capacity and to reduce large periodical differences in electricity demand. The 
underlying idea is that this latter incentive should induce lower transmission prices in periods 
                                            
5  Note that, capacity levels below  ˆtr Q  are also penalised according to our formula. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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where transmission capacity is not binding, because this smoothens demand and thus reduces 
the penalty. 
Constraint  tr
CPU R  captures the idea that the transmission firm should be rewarded for low 
electricity prices (and thus higher demand). This constraint is equivalent to permitting the firm 
to earn a fixed profit per unit of output and gives the firm an incentive for cost minimisation. 
Thus, with  0 tr k >  the firm will not invest in capacity in excess of what is needed to transport 
the traded electricity flows. Note that this incentive for cost minimisation is not given with the 
first regulation mechanism, where capacity costs and other costs are treated asymmetrically in 
the sense that firms have an incentive to increase capacity in order to increase the profit ceiling. 
The last constraint  tr
PC R  represents price-cap regulation. The (weighted) average transmission 
price should not exceed a predefined level, but it is left to the transmission firm to decide on the 
tariff structure.  
With  tr L  the Lagrange function, the first-order conditions are 
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Distribution companies are local natural monopolies. In the pre-liberalisation period, it is 
assumed that electricity distribution and retail are integrated in one regulated company. These 
companies are then subject to a price cap. After the liberalisation, the structure of activities will 
be the subject of two simulation scenarios. In these latter scenarios a regulation mechanism is 
assumed along the same lines as the mechanisms that are analysed for the transmission firm. 
The first post-liberalisation scenario assumes that electricity distribution and retail are vertically 
integrated in the distribution company. The second scenario assumes unbundling in electricity 
distribution and retail. This, however, does not change the formal structure of the distribution 
company’s optimisation problem. By assumption, it will only affect the parameter values at the 
cost side. 
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di
i R  describes the regulation mechanism for distribution company i . The same mechanisms as 
those described in the eqs. (17)-(19) are used. However, now we use the superscript di  to 
indicate distribution specific values. The first-order conditions for this optimisation problem are 













tt t dd i
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tt
d di di
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, : di



























The retail sector 
Two firms operate in retail when the distribution sector is unbundled. Retail companies are 
independent and profit maximising firms that sell in all market segments supplied via the 
distribution grid. Retailer  j 's profit function is 
  () , ,
jj j j rr r r















 in all periods t ∈ T . Retail companies merely act as sales companies and, 
therefore, they are not subject to any kind of physical capacity constraint, as it was the case for 
the generation, transmission and distribution firms. The sector is behaves competitively, and the 

































  µ τ ∀∈ ∈ M, T  (45) 
Welfare evaluation 
Simultaneously solving the first-order conditions that emerge from the behaviour described 
above, results in the outcome for the electricity sector. On the basis of this, welfare is calculated 
as the sum of consumer surpluses, the producer surpluses of the generators, the transmission and 
the distribution firms, and the tax revenues (value added tax). In the welfare calculation we 
assume that () 1 j ω −  percent of the incumbent’s and the entrant’s surplus flows abroad. This 
share is not taken into account in the welfare calculation. Welfare W  is then calculated as 
  j in in en en tr di r
m
mj
WC S P S P S P S P S P S T ωω
∈
=+ + + + + + ∑∑
+ M
. (46) 
3.  SCENARIOS, DATA AND MODEL CALIBRATION 
The model is calibrated on the basis of data for the Flemish electricity distribution sector in 
1998
6. The next subsections discus the scenarios, the functional forms and parameters and the 
simulation results. 
                                            
6  This year was chosen because of data availability. The Statistical yearbook of the Beroepsfederatie van de 
Producenten en Verdelers van Elektriciteit in België (1999) was used as the major source of data. Some information 
was also collected from a selection of 1998 annual reports of the Flemish mixed and pure intermunicipalities and 
regies and through contacts with the distribution sector. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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3.1. The  scenarios 
Two post-liberalisation scenarios are considered. In the first, the distribution sector is vertically 
integrated. Distribution companies can choose between two electricity generation companies 
when buying electricity on the wholesale market. Furthermore, a new regulation mechanism is 
imposed. The second scenario separates the old distribution firms into a regulated distribution 
companies for the transport activities and two competitive (non-regulated) retail companies for 
the sales activities. These latter companies merely buy electricity from the generators in order to 
sell to the final customers. Clearly, when retail firms would have market power, this would 
result in an additional double marginalisation problem
7. However, as the retail sector is assumed 
to behave perfectly competitive, this double marginalisation problem can safely be omitted. 
Furthermore, note that if the old integrated distribution firm would be unbundled in two 
separate firms, where the separation would not result in cost savings nor increases, then there 
would be no difference in the simulation results of scenario 1 and scenario 2. That is,  ,
di
mt p  in 
scenario 1 would be equal to  ,,
di r
mt mt pp +  in scenario 2. For the simulations in this paper, it is 
assumed that marginal retail costs are equal to a weighted average of the marginal cost 
reductions realised in the three types of distribution companies when they are unbundled. 
Therefore, some changes in the simulation results can be expected, although they are likely to 
be small. 
Apart from the two post-liberalisation scenario's, one additional scenario is simulated that 
mimics the situation before the liberalisation. This scenario serves as a benchmark. The next 
subsections describe the scenarios in more detail. 
3.1.1.  The reference scenario 
The reference scenario simulates an electricity market that has the typical characteristics of the 
Flemish electricity distribution sector in the late nineties. One incumbent generator supplies all 
markets
8. These markets are regulated through the fixing of price ceilings at the wholesale as 
well as at the retail level. The regulator, through a cost-plus based procedure, sets these price 
ceilings. The electricity transmission company is owned and controlled by the incumbent and it 
is assumed that it operates under a zero profit condition. Revenues are collected through a 
postage stamp charge. 
Three distribution companies carry out electricity distribution, i.e. a mixed intermunicipality 
(MIC), a pure intermunicipality (PIC) and a Regie. The incumbent generator and some Flemish 
municipalities jointly own the MIC, the PIC is owned by municipalities and the Regie is a 
small-scale distribution company owned and operated by one single municipality. Each firm 
                                            
7  A double marginalisation problem already exists between the generation, the transmission and the distribution firms. 
8  Note that in Belgium, there are two incumbent generators, the first one (Electrabel) covering about 90% of the 
market, the second one (SPE) covering about 8% of the market. As both generators cooperate intensively, we can 
safely assume that, in the reference scenario, the Flemish market is supplied through one single generator. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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maximises profit, without taking into account cross-ownership structures. The difference in 
ownership structures is assumed to have no effect on the nature of the different optimisation 
problems
9. The MIC distributes and supplies electricity to 80% of the household and SME 
market, the PIC has a market share of about 18% and the Regie supplies the remainder. 
The three types of distribution firms are distinguished because of observed cost differences and 
mainly because they have different rules for the distribution of profits. 
3.1.2.  Liberalising generation with integrated distribution and retail 
The post-liberalisation scenarios introduce an entrant in the generation market. This entrant 
increases the available generation capacity with 30% and he is assumed to behave as a price 
taker
10. Furthermore, all market segments are liberalised, i.e. the prices are set by the 
interaction of demand and supply. 
Generation and transmission are unbundled. The transmission company and the integrated 
distribution companies are subject to regulation. The type of regulation is the subject of 
simulation exercises. The municipalities own the transmission company for 30%, and therefore, 
it is assumed that they receive a proportional share of transmission profits. 
Transmission and distribution firms each decide on the price of their services, taking the prices 
of the other players as given. 
3.1.3.  Liberalising generation with unbundled distribution and retail 
The second scenario considers a separation of distribution and retail activities. The 
intermunicipalities and the Regie will take care of electricity distribution; retail activities are 
moved into two new firms. Clearly, this will have implications on the ownership structure of the 
firms operating in electricity distribution. In this paper, we adopt the following assumptions. 
The profit of the PIC is fully captured by the municipalities, whereas the municipalities capture 
70% of the MIC’s profit from distribution activities. The incumbent generator captures the 
remaining 30%. The municipalities supplied through the MIC's distribution area also reap 40% 
of the profits of the incumbents retail company. 
                                            
9  One could assume that the players take into account the ownership structures in their maximisation problem. For 
example, the generator could maximise the sum of its generation profit and of its profit share in the MIC’s profit. See 
for example Amundsen and Bergman (2002) for a model that explicitly considers ownership structure. 
10  In section 2 we presented a model that allowed for Cournot competition. However, for the sake of simplicity and 
because of the illustrative nature of the simulations, we decided to assume the competitor to be a competitive fringe. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     








Description  • All markets are regulated and 
subject to wholesale and 
consumer price constraints. 
• Distribution and retail are 
integrated in one firm. Three 
types of distribution 
companies are distinguished. 
• All markets are liberalised. No 
price constraints. 
• Distribution companies have 
free choice as to where to buy 
electricity. 
• Distribution and retail are 
unbundled. 
• Retail companies have free 
choice as to where to buy 
electricity. 
Generation  • One incumbent generator 
supplying all markets. 
• The generator sets the 
wholesale price in all market 
segments (subject to the price 
constraint) 
• Both the incumbent and the 
entrant can supply all markets. 
• The incumbent generator has 
market power. The entrant acts 
as a price taker. One wholesale 
price in each market segment. 
 
Transmission  • Transmission and generation 
are integrated. 
• The transmission company is 
assumed to operate under a 
zero profit constraint and 
charges uniform prices. 
• Transmission and generation 
are unbundled. 
• The transmission company is 
subject to regulation. 
 
Distribution  • Distribution and retail 
integrated in one firm. 
  • The electricity distribution firm 
is subject to regulation. 
Retail  • NA  • NA  • Retail firm sells electricity in a 
competitive market. Acts as a 
price taker. 
Table 1: Description of the scenarios simulated with the model. 
Two retail companies emerge in the unbundled and perfectly competitive retail market. These 
companies are vertically separated from the generation companies. Due to the assumptions of 
perfect competitiveness and about the cost structure of the retail sector, retail profits are zero. 
Table 1 summarises the scenarios. Only changes relative to the previous scenario are indicated. 
3.2.  Data and model calibration 
The simulations in this paper serve as an illustration of what can be done with the model. The 
price and quantity data closely match the values that are observed for the Flemish electricity 
market in 1998. However, this is not necessarily the case for the implied price elasticities of 
demand and for the parameters of the regulation mechanisms. Therefore, not too much 
attention should be paid to the size of the simulated changes. At best, the simulations indicate 
and illustrate sensitivities and the effects of different incentive schemes. For the moment, our 
main intention is to illustrate the sign of the impact of different regulation mechanisms. The size 
of the simulated cash flows towards municipalities can drastically change when the model is 
solved with other parameter values than those that are assumed in this section. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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Electricity demand 
Six periods are distinguished: winter peak () w-p , winter off-peak () w-op , mid-season peak 
() m-p , mid-season off-peak () m-op , summer peak () s-p  and summer off-peak () s-op  demand. 
These periods have different length  t h , measured in hours (see Table 3). Furthermore, three 
different types of electricity customers are identified, i.e. direct customers () dc , households 
() hh  and Small and Medium Enterprises () SME . Households and SMEs are supplied through 
the distribution grid; direct customers are supplied via the transmission grid. The distinction 
between these three categories is based on the voltage level at which electricity is supplied to 
the customers. At the distribution level, three (types of) distribution firms are assumed, i.e. 
mixed intermunicipalities (MIC), pure intermunicipalities (PIC) and regies. This results in the 















Linear inverse electricity demand in all periods is assumed. In each market segment, 
substitution between time-periods is allowed, i.e.  





  mt ∀∈ ∈ + M, T (47) 
However, in the simulation exercises no inter-period substitution is assumed, i.e. cross-price 
elasticities are set to zero. In the base case, direct customers, households and SMEs buy 
electricity in the regulated market. As described in subsection 3.1, these assumptions will change 
through the simulation exercises. 
 Own  Cross 
Households  -1,500 0,000 
SMEs  -2,200 0,000 
Direct customers  -2,500 0,000 
Table 2: Own and cross-price elasticities for peak and off-peak periods. 
Table 3 shows observed demand and prices in 1998. Using this information, the parameters of 
the inverse demand functions are constructed such that own-price elasticities of demand are 
close to the values in Table 2. The final result is demand parameters that – in the reference 
scenario – closely reproduce the observed data in Table 3. 
Variable  t h  MIC  PIC  Regies Direct 
Customers 
   hh SME hh SME hh SME  dc 
Quantities (GWh)           
Winter Peak    1.460  2.186,9  2.567,2  621,6  488,4  63,7  42,6  4.443,6 
Winter Off-peak    1.460  1.711,5  1.457,9  466,2  273,8  47,4  23,4  2.665,5 
Mid-season Peak    2.190  3.089,5  3.684,3  876,0  688,3  91,4  60,9  6.188,5 
Mid-season Off-peak    2.190  2.690,4  2.291,8  758,6  408,5  73,0  35,9  3.685,6 
Summer Peak    730  892,2  1.047,3  252,2  198,2  26,9  17,9  1.688,7 
Summer  Off-peak    730  863,1 735,2 244,0 131,4  23,0  11,3  1.198,7 
Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)         
End-user price (excl.VAT)    0,118 0,078 0,121 0,077 0,119 0,079 0,054* 
* average annual price            
Table 3: Data for model calibration. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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The consumer surplus is calculated by using the underlying utility function. Given the linear 
inverse demand functions, utility is quadratic, i.e. 
  ()
,
, ,, , 2
mt dt t
mm m mt mt mt
tt
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, (48) 
with  , ,
t
m mt bb τ
τ = . 
Electricity generation 
One incumbent () in  and (depending on the simulation run) one entrant () en  firm generate 
electricity. Both firms maximise profits. The incumbent firm has market power and sells 
electricity to all consumer types; the entrant is price taker and operates in the liberalised 
market segments. In liberalised markets, demand and supply determine the electricity price, in 
the regulated markets a price ceiling is set by the regulation office. The incumbent's profit 
function is described by (3), the entrant's profit function by (13). Both firms are subject to some 
technical and regulation constraints. The number and type of constraints that is imposed 
depends on the simulation run. 
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with  j F  the fixed generation cost of firm  j  and  j Q  the generation capacity in firm  j . From 
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The marginal cost of producing with the cheapest available generation technology is  1
j
t c . The 
marginal generation cost at maximum generation capacity is  12
j j
tt cc + . 
In regulated markets, the incumbent firm acts as a monopolist. In liberalised markets, the 
incumbent is faced with a competitive fringe. From the assumptions on the demand and cost 
functions, it can be derived that an equilibrium exists in each market segment. 
Table 4 summarises the parameter values for the generation cost: 
Parameter  Value incumbent  Value entrant 
1
j
t c  (€/kWh)  0,0100  0,0124 
2
j
t c  (€/kWh)  0,0397  0,0347 
j
t F  (Mln  €)  0,0000  0,0000 
j φ  3,0000  2,0000 
j ω  0,5000  0,0000 
j
Q  (MW)    8.900  2.500 
Table 4: Parameters for the generation firms. 
In the welfare calculation, it is assumed that the entrant is a foreign firm. Ownership of the 
incumbent firm is for 50% in the hands of foreign owners, i.e.  0.5 in ω =  and  0 en ω = . Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     




In problem (16), it is assumed that the cost of providing transmission services is separable into 
operating costs and capacity costs. The operating costs contain a fixed cost component ()
tr F  
and a volume dependent component ()
tr
t c . The transmission cost defined as: 
  () () () ,, 1 tr tr tr w tr tr
t t tr m t tr m t
m
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Table 5 summarises the parameter choices for the transmission firm. In the simulation exercises, 
different assumptions are made with respect to the regulation mechanism that is imposed on the 
transmission company. The unit cost of transmission capacity  tr k  equals €0,0025 per kWh
12. 
The allowed 'fair' return per unit of capital  tr s  is assumed equal to €0,00375 per kWh. 
Transmission losses equal 1% of the amount of electricity, which is put on the grid. We assume 
that the transmission firm pays for the cost of these transmission losses. The constant marginal 
cost of transmission is assumed equal to €0,0005, and the fixed transmission cost is equal to 
€99,157 Mln. 
Parameter Value 
tr k   (€ per kWh)   0,00250 
tr s   (€ per kWh)   0,00375 
tr f   (€ per kWh)   0,00000 
tr g   (€ per kWh)   0,00000 
tr ξ     0,00000 
t l  (%)    1,00000 
tr c   (€ per kWh)   0,00050 
tr
t F  (Mln  €)   99,15741 
Table 5: Parameters for electricity transmission. 
Electricity distribution 
Distribution firm i 's cost function is 
  () () () () ,, , , ,, ,, 1 di di w tr di d di
it it it it i hit d i d i hit
h
CQ p pl lcq F
∈
=+ + ++ ∑
H
 , (52) 
with  ,
di
it c  the per-unit distribution cost of company i  in period t, and  di
i F  the distribution 
companies fixed cost. The distribution firms are regulated on the basis of the same principles as 
the regulation of the transmission companies. The unit cost of distribution capacity  di k  is set 
equal to €0,0025 per kWh. The allowed 'fair' return per unit of capital  di s  is equal to €0,00375 
per kWh.  Table 6 summarises the parameter choices for the distribution sector. 
                                            
11  See Bailey and White (1974). 
12  The CREG, which is the Belgian Federal regulator, estimates the replacement value of the transmission grid at 
about €3.500 Mln. We assume that the Belgian grid has a capacity to absorb 17GW. On an annual basis, this implies 
a per kWh cost of €0,0235. Assuming a lifetime of 50 years and a 10% discount rate, this approximately results in a 
cost of 0,250 eurocent. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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The profit of the distribution firms is distributed among the shareholders. In the case of the 
mixed intermunicipality, profits are distributed among the municipalities, the private firm and 
the province. The profit of the pure intermunicipality is almost fully captured by the 
municipalities. The profit of the Regie goes entirely to the municipality. Note that the profit 
sharing rules change after the liberalisation. Profits are shared on the basis of participation in 
ownership. The profit shares ( ,, Mun Inc Pro σσ σ ) are summarised in Table 6. 
Parameter MIC  PIC  Regie 
General parameters       
di k   (€  per  kWh)   0,00250  0,00250  0,00250 
d l   (%)   4,00000  4,00000  4,00000 
di
t F   (Mln  €)    253,45928  78,62374   6,61405 
Reference scenario     
di s   (€  per  kWh)   0,00375  0,00375  0,00375 
di f   (€  per  kWh)   0,00000  0,00000  0,00000 
di g   (€  per  kWh)   0,00000  0,00000  0,00000 
di ξ     0,00000  0,00000  0,00000 
di c   (€  per  kWh)   0,00407*   0,00426*   0,00454* 
Mun σ  (%)  58  97,50  100 
Inc σ  (%)  40  –  – 
Pro σ  (%)  2  2,50  – 
After liberalisation (vertically integrated distribution and retail) 
di c   (€  per  kWh)   0,00407*   0,00426*   0,00454* 
ˆ
Mun σ  (%)  70  100  100 
ˆ
Inc σ  (%)  30  –  – 
ˆ
Pro σ  (%)  –  –  – 
After liberalisation (unbundled distribution and retail) 
di c   (€  per  kWh)   0,00082*   0,00085*   0,00091* 
ˆ
Mun σ  (%)  70  100  100 
ˆ
Inc σ  (%)  30  –  – 
ˆ
Pro σ  (%)  –  –  – 
Profit share received from transmission firm (liberalised markets) 
 (%)  23,70  6,00  0,30 
* Average values      
Table 6: Parameters for the distribution sector. 
The retail sector 
Retail companies are independent, profit maximising firms, operating in a competitive market. 
They sell to all customer types supplied through the distribution grid. A retailer's profit function 
is defined in (44), and for simulation purposes the cost function is defined as 
  () () () () ,,, , , , 1
jj jj j j
rr r r r rw t r d i r
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∈∈
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   (53) 
In this exercise, we assume that all retailers act as a price taker. Table 7 describes the 
parameter values. Note that these parameters are relevant only for the scenario with unbundled 
distribution and retail activities. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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Parameter Retailer  in  Retailer  en  
r c  (€/kWh)   0,00343   0,00343 
t  (%)  21,00  21,00 
r
t F  (Mln  €)   0,00000   0,00000 
Table 7: Parameter values for the retail firms. 
The next subsection describes the simulated scenarios. 
4.  THE SIMULATION RESULTS 
This section describes the simulation results. We focus on the impact of the regulation 
mechanism on electricity prices and on the cash flow of the municipalities. 
4.1.1.  The reference scenario 
Table 8 summarises the simulation results for the reference scenario. As expected, the results are 
close to the real world values. 
Variable MIC  PIC  Regies  Direct 
Customers 
  HH SME HH SME HH SME   
Market share    23,33%    24,04%     6,57%     4,47%     0,66%     0,39%    40,54% 
Electricity  demand  (GWh)         
Winter  Peak  2.186,9 2.567,2  621,6  488,4  63,7  42,6 4.443,7 
Winter  Off-peak  1.711,5 1.457,9  466,2  273,8  47,4  23,4 2.665,5 
Mid-season  Peak  3.089,5 3.684,3  876,0  688,3  91,4  60,9 6.188,5 
Mid-season  Off-peak  2.690,4 2.291,8  758,6  408,5  73,0  35,9 3.685,6 
Summer Peak  892,2  1.047,3  252,2  198,2  26,9  17,9  1.688,7 
Summer  Off-peak  863,1 735,2 244,0 131,4  23,0  11,3  1.198,7 
Total  11.433,6  11.783,7 3.218,6 2.188,6    325,4    192,0  19.870,7 
Consumer Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
All  periods  0,118 0,078 0,121 0,077 0,119 0,079 – 
Sum of wholesale electricity prices and transmission prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT) 
Winter  Peak  0,067 0,067 0,067 0,067 0,067 0,067 0,067 
Winter  Off-peak  0,050 0,050 0,050 0,050 0,050 0,050 0,050 
Mid-season  Peak  0,061 0,061 0,061 0,061 0,061 0,061 0,061 
Mid-season  Off-peak  0,047 0,047 0,047 0,047 0,047 0,047 0,047 
Summer  Peak  0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,055 
Summer  Off-peak  0,042 0,042 0,042 0,042 0,042 0,042 0,042 
Distribution Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Winter  Peak  0,052 0,011 0,054 0,010 0,052 0,012  – 
Winter  Off-peak  0,068 0,028 0,071 0,026 0,069 0,029  – 
Mid-season  Peak  0,057 0,016 0,060 0,015 0,057 0,018  – 
Mid-season  Off-peak  0,072 0,031 0,074 0,030 0,072 0,033  – 
Summer  Peak  0,063 0,023 0,066 0,021 0,064 0,024  – 
Summer  Off-peak  0,076 0,035 0,079 0,034 0,076 0,037  – 
* Consumer prices and wholesale electricity prices are taken from BFE (1999). The distribution prices are derived from the 
annual reports of the distribution companies.  
Table 8: Simulation results for the reference scenario. 
The resulting cash flows for the municipalities are as described in Table 9. They closely match 
the cash flows reported in the annual reports of the distribution companies. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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Intermunicipality  Reference  Scenario  1    Scenario  2  














CF from distribution               
MIC  100,0 31,4 50,9 86,6 31,3 50,9 86,8 
PIC  100,0 22,5 37,1 53,5 22,6 37,1 54,3 
Regie  100,0 22,6 33,1 53,9 22,8 33,2 55,3 
Total  distribution  100,0 28,6 46,4 76,1 28,6 46,4 76,5 
Total (distribution 
and transmission)  100,0 58,3 72,4  157,6 58,3 72,4  157,8 
Table 9: Cash flows directed to the municipalities (Relative to Reference). 
4.1.2.  Liberalising generation with integrated distribution and retail 
In this scenario, three cases are simulated, the difference being the regulation mechanism chosen 
by the regulator. In order to make the results comparable, the following procedure has been 
followed. First, scenario 1 is simulated with  ROR R  as the regulation mechanism for both the 
transmission and the distribution firms. Then, for the  CPU R  regulation case, we take the 
(equilibrium) per-unit profit of the  ROR R -case and use this as the constant profit per unit of 
output (sk − ) in the  CPU R  simulation. Finally, for the  PC R  mechanism, we take the weighted 
average transmission and distribution prices from the  ROR R -case and use these as the price 
caps. The parameters of the  ROR R  regulation rule itself have been chosen from a range of values 
that are assumed to be acceptable. 
In the discussion of the results, we focus on the distribution sector. Therefore, only prices and 
results related to the distribution sector are presented in detail. The price results are 
summarised in Table 12. Capacity choices summarised in Table 11, and welfare effects are found 
in Table 10. 
Variable  Reference  Scenario  1    Scenario  2  














Consumer Surplus  100,0 59,3  122,5 67,6 59,3  122,5 67,4 
Households  100,0 43,6 79,4 57,2 43,6 79,4 56,9 
SMEs  100,0 57,5  178,8 63,5 57,5  178,8 63,2 
Direct  Customers  100,0 100,9 179,7  98,0 100,9 179,7  98,0 
Producer Surplus  100,0 58,2 99,3 94,4 58,2 99,3 94,3 
Generation  &  Transmission  100,0 61,7  118,3  102,2 61,7  118,3  101,9 
Distribution  MIC  100,0 51,1 61,8 81,4 51,1 61,8 81,5 
Distribution  PIC  100,0 52,4 61,1 70,8 52,4 61,1 71,3 
Distribution  Regie  100,0 49,0 55,6 69,4 49,0 55,6 70,4 
Retail  – – – – 0,0  0,0  0,0 
Taxes  100,0 87,5  105,9 90,7 87,5  105,9 90,7 
Social Welfare*(Mln €)  100,0 66,7  102,2 94,3 66,7  102,2 94,2 
* Flemish Social Welfare is calculated by taking the unweighted sum of all surpluses, except the entrant’s surplus, which is not 
taken into account and half of the incumbent’s surplus. 
Table 10: The welfare effects (Relative to Reference). Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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Transmission and distribution capacity 
Liberalising the generation market and implementing rate-of-return regulation will give 
incentives to electricity transport companies to increase their installed capacity. The reason is 
obvious. Under ROR-regulation, allowed profits are positively related to the size of the so-called 
regulated asset base. For electricity transport companies, the grid is by far the most important 
asset, thus installing grid transport capacity increases the asset base and thus the allowed profit 
level. 
In the CPU and the PC regulation mechanisms, this incentive is not present. With CPU 
regulation, allowed profits are related to total output. Since capacity has a cost ( tr k  and  di k ), a 
profit maximising firm will install no more capacity than effectively needed to satisfy transport 
demand in the peak period(s). The same argument holds under PC-regulation. 
Thus, under ROR-regulation, the transport firms will invest in transport capacity, which is not 
used. This will not be the case under CPU or PC regulation. This point is illustrated in Table 
11. 
Firm  Reference  Scenario  1    Scenario  2  
   ROR R   CPU R   PC R   ROR R   CPU R   PC R  
Transmission  7.369,4  38.150,4 8.412,8 5.952,6  38.149,0 8.412,5 5.945,8 
MIC  3.386,5  11.783,5 3.604,0 2.333,4  11.770,5 3.602,4 2.327,5 
PIC 790,7  2.486,3  739,4  548,0  2.495,0  740,3  546,8 
Regie  75,6  270,8 72,6 53,9  273,2 72,9 53,8 
Table 11: Capacity choices in the different scenarios (GW). 
Prices 
In order to understand the evolution of end-user prices, it is necessary to know how the different 
components of the end-user price evolve. 
Wholesale electricity prices 
From Table 12, it can be derived that the contribution of the wholesale electricity price is fairly 
constant, irrespective of the consumer type. The presence of a profit maximising and price-
taking entrant with sufficiently large generation capacity forces all wholesale prices to be almost 
equal for all customer types. However, wholesale prices will differ significantly between periods. 
This cannot be seen in the tables, but prices range from €0,023 to €0,034 in 'summer off-peak' 
and 'winter-peak', respectively. Moreover, electricity generation is not a regulated activity. 
Therefore, the regulation mechanism should only play an indirect role via its impact on 
aggregate demand. This latter effect explains why the wholesale electricity price is larger under 
CPU-regulation. This regulation mechanism gives a large incentive for price reduction and 
output increase. Clearly, this results in increased wholesale prices for electricity, which partly 
compensate the decrease in transmission and distribution prices. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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Transmission and distribution prices 
The  structure of transport prices does not differ significantly when different regulation 
mechanisms are applied.  Under ROR-regulation as well as under CPU and PC-regulation, the 
transmission and distribution firms charge significantly lower prices to the SMEs and to direct 
customers. This result is a reflection of the well-known ‘inverse elasticity’ rule. For a profit 
maximising firm, the best way to proceed is to charge lower prices in those markets where price 
elasticities of demand are (relatively) high, which, in the setting of this model, is the case in for 
direct customers for SMEs. 
Note that under the ROR-regulation mechanism, there is overinvestment in capacity. The 
capacity constraint is not binding, and all  t γ  are zero. Furthermore, for the simulations, we 
have assumed  0 tr tr f g == . One can then derive from the first-order conditions that the 
optimal pricing rule reduces the pricing rule of an unconstrained monopolist, i.e. pricing is such 
that marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. Thus, a ROR-mechanism with these 
characteristics will not result in reduced prices for the customers compared to the pricing 
behaviour of an unconstrained monopolist. Introducing  0 tr f >  will induce the firm to stimulate 
output by reducing prices, but in general the incentive for overinvestment in capacity remains 
as long as  0 tr tr tr skf −−> . Note that the ROR-mechanism converges to the CPU-regulation 
mechanism as  tr f  increases. 
Under CPU-regulation, the pricing rule essentially follows the same principles as under ROR-
regulation. However, now the overall price level is adjusted downward. This reflects the fact 
that CPU-regulation gives an incentive for firms to increase output, and the best way to achieve 
this is to induce increased demand through reduced prices. 
With price cap regulation, the pricing rules essentially have the same features. Prices are 
adjusted downward compared to the prices under the ROR-regulation mechanism, but in our 
simulations, the downward shift is not as large as under CPU-regulation. The price adjustment 
under PC-regulation is function of its price elasticity, whereas under CPU-regulation this 
adjustment is time and customer independent. 
Finally, note that for the transmission as well as for the distribution companies, the capacity is 
binding in the ‘mid-season peak’-period. 
End-user prices 
More variation in end-user prices is observed after the liberalisation, and in all cases the average 
price level increases for households. The increase is largest under the  ROR R - and the  PC R -
mechanism. Under  CPU R , household prices also increase, but to a lesser extent. Average 
consumer prices for the SMEs also increase, except under the  CPU R  mechanism, where they 
decrease. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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Cash flows towards the municipalities 
Table 9 summarises the cash flows towards the municipalities. Due to the liberalisation, these 
cash flows will change drastically, but the sign and the size of the change depends on the 
regulation mechanism that is implemented. 
First, consider the cash flows from distribution activities. Here, all simulations suggest that cash 
flows will reduce. The ROR-case produces the largest reduction. However, this reduction is 
compensated by an increased cash flow from transmission activities. In the case of PC-
regulation, this compensation is even sufficient to turn the loss in cash flows from distribution 
activities into an overall increase in cash flows compared to the reference scenario. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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Variable MIC  PIC  Regies  Direct 
Customers 
  HH SME HH SME HH SME   
ROR-Regulation 
Electricity demand (GWh)  7.568,0 9.075,5 2.113,6 1.578,8  213,5  140,7  19.798,2 
Consumer Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,146 0,085 0,151 0,086 0,148 0,088 0,055 
Wholesale electricity prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)         
Weighted  average  0,028 0,029 0,028 0,029 0,028 0,029 0,029 
Transmission Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,056 0,025 0,058 0,026 0,056 0,027 0,026 
Distribution Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Winter  Peak  0,059 0,031 0,062 0,030 0,062      0,031   
Winter  Off-peak  0,065 0,032 0,066 0,033 0,065      0,034   
Mid-season  Peak  0,063 0,028 0,064 0,031 0,062      0,032   
Mid-season  Off-peak  0,062 0,033 0,066 0,033 0,065      0,034   
Summer  Peak  0,062 0,033 0,064 0,032 0,063      0,033   
Summer  Off-peak  0,065 0,034 0,066 0,033 0,065      0,035   
CPU-Regulation 
Electricity demand (GWh)  10.220,8 15.950,6  2.830,7  2.774,4  292,5  249,6 26.565,3 
Consumer Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,127 0,066 0,131 0,067 0,127 0,069 0,046 
Wholesale electricity prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)         
Weighted  average  0,043 0,044 0,044 0,044 0,044 0,044 0,045 
Transmission Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,037 0,007 0,039 0,008 0,039 0,010 0,002 
Distribution Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Winter Peak  0,039  0,011   0,048    0,016   0,043  0,013   
Winter Off-peak  0,049  0,016   0,050    0,016   0,046  0,015   
Mid-season Peak  0,051  0,016   0,047    0,014   0,044  0,014   
Mid-season Off-peak  0,046  0,017   0,049    0,017   0,046  0,015   
Summer Peak  0,045  0,016   0,046    0,014   0,043  0,013   
Summer Off-peak  0,050  0,019   0,050    0,017   0,046  0,016   
PC-Regulation 
Electricity demand (GWh)  8.564,9 9.345,6 2.503,3 1.723,6  254,0  154,5  19.596,9 
Consumer Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,139 0,084 0,140 0,083 0,137 0,086 0,055 
Wholesale electricity prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)         
Weighted  average  0,029 0,030 0,029 0,030 0,030 0,030 0,030 
Transmission Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,051 0,024 0,056 0,026 0,055 0,027 0,025 
Distribution Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Winter Peak  0,053  0,027   0,053   0,027  0,051   0,027   
Winter Off-peak  0,059  0,030   0,054   0,028  0,052   0,029   
Mid-season Peak  0,064  0,032   0,057   0,030  0,055   0,032   
Mid-season Off-peak  0,056  0,030   0,054   0,028  0,052   0,029   
Summer Peak  0,057  0,030   0,052   0,026  0,051   0,027   
Summer Off-peak  0,060  0,032   0,054   0,028  0,053   0,029   
 
Table 12: Simulation results for scenario 1. 
The following paragraphs clarify the driving forces for the cash flow changes. In order to 
understand these changes, one has to understand why transmission and distribution profits 
change. Clearly, the regulation mechanisms play an important role here. 
Rate-of-return regulation 
The cash flow decrease under ROR-regulation occurs because we observe a sharp increase in 
transmission prices compared to the reference scenario. However, for a correct comparison, one Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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should compare the sum of the wholesale price and the transmission price, because in the 
reference scenario, these activities were integrated in one firm. A compensating effect comes 
from a reduction in average wholesale prices (due to increased competition in the generation 
market), but this decrease is not sufficient to neutralise the transmission price increase. As a 
result, end-user prices increase, especially for households and to a lesser extent for SMEs. In the 
aggregate, these increased prices result in reduced demand and output. Clearly, this latter effect 
also contributes to reduced wholesale prices for electricity. 
It was explained before that, with the parameterisation of  ROR R  in this paper, monopoly pricing 
would occur. Compared to the reference scenario, this will result in increased transmission 
prices. Note that in the reference scenario, transmission prices were uniform and based on a 
zero-profit condition
13. 
Monopoly pricing will also occur at the distribution level, but here prices were already relatively 
high in the reference case. Thus, changes in distribution prices are rather modest under ROR-
regulation, and the decrease in demand should necessarily result in reduced distribution profits 
and thus reduced cash flows towards the municipalities. Cash flows from transmission are not 
sufficient to compensate for this. 
Constant-profit-per-unit-of-output regulation 
CPU-regulation gives strong incentives to the transmission and the distribution firms to reduce 
their prices, because this would result in increased output and thus a softened regulation 
constraint. This increased demand will result in increased wholesale prices in the generation 
market. Relative to the reference case, prices for households will increase and prices for SMEs 
will decrease. Overall, transmission and distribution profits will decrease relative to the reference 
case. Compared to ROR-regulation, cash flows from distribution activities will increase, mainly 
because grid capacity investments are much lower. 
Price-cap regulation 
Note that the imposed price cap is based on the average prices that resulted from implementing 
the ROR-mechanism. In principle, the transmission and distribution firms could implement 
exactly the same price structure as under ROR-regulation. This would result in higher profits 
compared to ROR-regulation, because now the grid companies would not overinvest in grid 
capacity (cost would be much lower.). Thus, with PC-regulation, grid capacity will be binding, 
and the firms can even further increase profits by charging higher prices in periods with binding 
capacity. This would further reduce capacity and in order to keep the regulation constraint 
satisfied, prices in other periods should also be reduced. 
                                            
13  The implicit assumption behind it is that, in the reference case, generation and transmission were integrated in one 
firm, charging one price covering both transmission and distribution. Here we separate the price by assuming that a 
zero profit condition applied to the transmission activities. This assumption has no impact on the simulation results, 
as, in the reference case, there is a price cap on the sum of generation and transmission prices, and there are no cash 
flows towards municipalities due to transmission activities. Restructuring Flemish Electricity Distribution     
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The cost savings from reduced investment in grid capacity is the driving force behind the higher 
cash flows under PC-regulation compared to ROR-regulation. 
Welfare 
For consumers, welfare change is measured through the consumer surplus, and changes in the 
consumer surplus are closely related to changes in end-user prices. The simulations suggest that, 
relative to the reference scenario, households will be worse of after the liberalisation. This 
conclusion holds irrespective of the regulation mechanism that is applied. SMEs would also loose 
from the liberalisation if the ROR- or PC-regulation would be imposed. With CPU-regulation, 
the SMEs would benefit. Direct customers are most likely to benefit from the liberalisation, 
certainly if CPU would be applied. 
Relative to the reference scenario, the incumbent generator will incur a reduction in profits. 
First, because he is faced with a competitive fringe, which puts a downward pressure on 
wholesale prices, and second, because aggregate output is decreased due to a reduction in 
market share and an average increase in end-user prices. This latter effect does not exist under 
CPU-regulation, because transmission and distribution firms then have an incentive to reduce 
their prices. 
By definition, the change in welfare or producer surplus for the transmission and distribution 
firms is closely linked to the profit changes. These changes were discussed in the previous 
paragraphs. 
In this model, tax revenues only reflect revenue from the value added tax. 
4.1.3.  Unbundling distribution and retail 
The assumptions of perfectly competitive retail markets and no (dis)economies of scale or scope 
in retail, explain why the results of the second scenario are very similar to the results of the first 
scenario. The results are shown in Table 11. We do not present a detailed discussion of the 
results, because the underlying reasoning is exactly the same as for the simulations with 
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27
Variable MIC  PIC  Regies  Direct 
Customers 
  HH SME HH SME HH SME   
ROR-Regulation 
Electricity demand (GWh)  7.568,2 9.070,7 2.114,9 1.581,2  213,9  141,3  19.798,6 
Consumer Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,146 0,085 0,151 0,086 0,148 0,088 0,055 
Wholesale electricity prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)         
Weighted  average  0,028 0,029 0,028 0,029 0,029 0,029 0,029 
Transmission Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,056 0,025 0,058 0,026 0,056 0,027 0,026 
Distribution Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Winter  Peak  0,053 0,028 0,059 0,027 0,058      0,028   
Winter  Off-peak  0,061 0,029 0,063 0,029 0,061      0,031   
Mid-season  Peak  0,060 0,025 0,061 0,027 0,029      0,028   
Mid-season  Off-peak  0,058 0,029 0,063 0,030 0,061      0,031   
Summer  Peak  0,059 0,030 0,061 0,028 0,060      0,029   
Summer  Off-peak  0,062 0,031 0,062 0,030 0,061      0,031   
Retail Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003   
CPU-Regulation 
Electricity demand (GWh)  10.218,0 15.943,2  2.833,0  2.778,3  293,2  250,5 26.566,1 
Consumer Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,127 0,066 0,131 0,067 0,127 0,069 0,046 
Wholesale electricity prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)         
Weighted  average  0,043 0,044 0,044 0,044 0,044 0,044 0,045 
Transmission Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,037 0,0007  0,040 0,008 0,039 0,010 0,002 
Distribution Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Winter Peak  0,036  0,007   0,044    0,012   0,040  0,009   
Winter Off-peak  0,045  0,013   0,046    0,012   0,042  0,012   
Mid-season Peak  0,047  0,012   0,044    0,010   0,040  0,010   
Mid-season Off-peak  0,042  0,013   0,046    0,013   0,042  0,011   
Summer Peak  0,042  0,012   0,043    0,010   0,039  0,009   
Summer Off-peak  0,046  0,015   0,046    0,013   0,042  0,012   
Retail Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003   
PC-Regulation 
Electricity demand (GWh)  8.541,5 9.323,4 2.496,6 1.720,9  153,3  154,5  19.599,1 
Consumer Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,139 0,084 0,140 0,083 0,137 0,086 0,055 
Wholesale electricity prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)         
Weighted  average  0,029 0,030 0,029 0,030 0,030 0,030 0,030 
Transmission Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,051 0,024 0,056 0,026 0,055 0,027 0,025 
Distribution Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Winter Peak  0,050  0,024   0,050   0,024  0,048   0,024   
Winter Off-peak  0,053  0,026   0,051   0,024  0,049   0,025   
Mid-season Peak  0,060  0,029   0,054   0,027  0,052   0,028   
Mid-season Off-peak  0,053  0,027   0,051   0,025  0,049   0,025   
Summer Peak  0,054  0,027   0,049   0,023  0,048   0,024   
Summer Off-peak  0,056  0,028   0,051   0,025  0,050   0,026   
Retail Prices (€ per kWh, excl. VAT)           
Weighted  average  0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003   
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5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Flanders (Belgium), distribution companies are to a (very) large extent owned by the 
municipalities and as such these municipalities collect an important share of the profits from 
electricity distribution. This situation cannot be maintained because, in the process of electricity 
market liberalisation, the ownership will be reshuffled and because the old regulation 
mechanism, allowing for such cash flows, will be revised. 
This paper presents some simulations on the restructuring of the electricity distribution sector, 
using a partial equilibrium model. The simulations illustrate the potential impact of the 
regulation mechanism on prices and on the cash flows towards municipalities. Three regulation 
schemes are simulated, 'rate-of-return' regulation, 'constant profit per unit of output' regulation 
and 'price-cap' regulation. 
With respect to the behaviour of the different players, it is assumed that they all act in their 
own interest, i.e. all firms maximise profits and consumers maximise utility. Generators set 
quantities, taking transmission, distribution and retail prices (if applicable) as given. The 
transmission, the distribution and the retail firms all set the prices of their service, taking the 
prices set by the other players as given. 
The model is calibrated for the Flemish electricity distribution sector in 1998. The simulations 
show that, irrespective of the regulation scheme, it is not obvious that end-user electricity prices 
will decrease after the liberalisation. Moreover, the restructuring will have a large impact on the 
profits received by the municipalities, and the sign of this impact depends on the regulation 
mechanism that is imposed. 
It appears that – for the parameter values that were used in this simulation exercise – the rate-
of-return regulation mechanism performs badly, both in terms of generated municipal cash flows 
and in terms of welfare. We feel that this is likely to be the case for many parameterisations of 
rate-of-return regulation. Therefore, it should better not be adopted. For the presented 
simulations one should opt for price cap regulation if one cares about municipal cash flows. If 
one cares about welfare, then constant-profit-per-unit-of-output performs best. 
It is important to keep in mind that the simulation results in this paper can only be interpreted 
as illustrations of what could happen when different regulation mechanisms are imposed on 
transmission and distribution companies. The numbers that come out of the simulations can and 
will change drastically (although not necessarily the conclusions) when other parameter values 
are used to calibrate the model. This points out a first direction of future research and the need 
for sensitivity analysis. Also, it would be worthwhile to look at the effect on the outcome of the 
model if market power in the retail sector would be assumed. 
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